THE RAID
Yashwant Deva
(A chapter from the Author’s forthcoming book,
Sky is the Limit: Signals in Op Pawan)
“The
major lesson from the Sri Lanka operation was in the field of Signal
Intelligence. This is a field where the potential is enormous I hope my account
will spur some expert, may be Yashwant Deva, to cover it in greater and more
technical detail.”
- Lt Gen
Depinder Singh, IPKF in Sri Lanka1
There were reports that radio communications of the militants were active all along the Tamil Nadu coastline, and these often enjoyed the connivance and the patronage of the police, perhaps the intelligence agencies and the political parties in the state too. I deployed a detachment of 4 Radio Monitoring Company under Subedar Victor John Aleti at Mandapam. At that time electronic warfare resources were not allotted to the Southern Command. To fill the void, personnel of the monitoring company were tasked to carry out interception of radio sets of the militants. Sub Aleti who had only vintage receivers to boast of, did a commendable job. An estimation of signal strength, general direction of radio transmissions and geographical correlation of analysis of the captured traffic led to quite a few locations in areas of Point Pedro, Thanjavur, Rameshwaram, Ramnad and Mandapam.
In one of my reconnaissance visits to these areas in October 1987, I sought help from the Coast Guard at Mandapam and the Territorial Army unit at Thanjavur and tasked Lt Col N S Vasavan commander of the Tropo Sub Group located at Mandapam to physically locate the hostile stations and keep them under surveillance. Significantly a station was reported metaphorically, right under our very nose. A “lambda-by-two” wire antenna gave away the telltale sign.
On the morning of the 3rd November 1987, I took a section strength from the Tropo Sub Group and along with Col Vasavan simply walked into the so- called “radio workshop.” Outwardly this was a place for repairing radio sets. Inside it was a full-fledged communication facility, a workshop to make radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (RCIEDs) and other simple gadgetry and a signal training facility, all rolled in one. As we walked in, I noticed a lungi-clad man hurriedly pickup a half assembled Printed Circuit Board (PCB) from a table and rush out. A jawan pointed a weapon at him. I restrained him from shooting. By that time the man had jumped over a wall and vanished. A closer look at the table showed a circuit diagram of a remote control device, a hot soldering iron and some components.
There were three other men inside the so-called workshop. They offered no resistance when we collected the equipment and a treasure trove of incriminating literature and papers. There was a flag of People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Ealam (PLOTE), some photographs of PLOTE leaders and a few papers that fooled me in believing that it was a PLOTE facility. That this kind of cover up is part of the deception game dawned on me later, but what nagged my intellect then was the frequency on which the transmitter and the antenna were set. We measured the length of the antenna and calculated. It matched; besides intercepts on that frequency were undoubtedly those of the LTTE.
Lt Gen
Depinder Singh, whose permission was taken post-facto, describes this raid in
his book, IPKF in Sri Lanka. He writes, “One day the CSO, Major General
Deva sought my permission to raid one such station, which through his
resources, he had been able to locate. I readily gave permission and the
Signals mounted a raid to recover not only a sophisticated radio and allied
equipment, but also a box full of books on electronics and publications like Amateur
Radio and Electronics for You and the like.”2 A true
commander in him, he had shielded my initiative, should a rap come. Of course
there were political murmurs, but the OFC, the mettle that he is made of, was
not the one to be singed by them. This is one of the incidents that he
describes to prove his point that the Tamil Nadu Government had been providing
assistance to the LTTE. Another that too has Signals connection, merits
narration. He writes, “In January 1988, IPKF Signals intercepted a message
between LTTE HQ and station in or around Madras seeking the latest information
on the arrest earlier that morning of three LTTE personnel by a team of customs
officials outside Madras. This bit of information naturally made us prick our
ears and investigations were immediately launched to ascertain more details.
What we learnt was truly amazing: early that morning a customs team on a
routine road check, intercepted a van in which they discovered three men who
confessed to belong to the LTTE; inside the van were some arms, ammunition,
explosives and radio sets. The customs officials then sought directions from
higher authorities and were directed to impound the van and its contents but to
release the men!”3
These incidents which in the words of Lt Gen Depinder Singh,“for some strange reasons never received the publicity”4 would have gone in oblivion and the history as its wont tarnished and corrupted, had a tragedy not struck in the form of gruesome killing of Rajiv Gandhi three and a half years later, and Jain Commission not been constituted to enquire into the conspiracy. Pages after pages have been written on after-assassination wisdom in the report. Much of the evidence is in the public domain on the Web and I quote few extracts of the evidence brought before the Commission on oath, relevant to our mission.
· “On February 5, 1991, a drive to trace Kiruban, who headed the LTTE setup in Tamil Nadu, was launched. Two important cadres, Thavoor (wireless operator) and Das were taken into custody from an LTTE hideout at Madras. Kiruban was arrested soon after. The search of the house where wireless station was located led to the recovery of one High Frequency wireless set, ammunition, a walkie talkie, a set of high grade cipher pads and incriminating documents relating to LTTE's close links with the DMK.”5
·
“During
the President's Rule in Tamil Nadu, it was known to the intelligence agencies
that wireless messages were being exchanged in complicated codes between Jaffna
and Tamil Nadu. These messages were proof of the existence of a clandestine
wireless network in Tamil Nadu. Some crucial wireless intercepts containing
LTTE messages of March 1991, were found to have a direct bearing on the
preparations being made by the LTTE for the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi.
Two such coded messages, passed between LTTE cadres in Tamil Nadu and LTTE HQs
at Jaffna were intercepted on the 21st and the 22nd March
1991. The first message stated Rajiv Gandhi is coming to Madras on this 30.
The second message stated, (should) attempt at Madras or at the Capital? If
in Capital, it requires strenuous efforts and sufficient time. If to attempt on
(Date) give reply. Unfortunately, none of these messages could be decoded
till the assassination.6
· "It is reliably learnt that Dixon, who was earlier manning the clandestine wireless communication station at Madras, has since come back to Tamil Nadu probably on March 3, 1991. He is likely to re-establish the links between 'land', London and 'KP'. His arrival had been made known to Kittu in London. Dixon would be code named 'Thingal' for the time being. (efforts are on to locate Dixon).” This was followed by another message, "Dixon, a radio operator of LTTE .... has surfaced in Madras on March 17. According to available indications, he was trying to contact 'KP' from Madras. Dixon is suspected to have gone back to Tiruchirapalli on March 17."7
· “KP @ T.S.Kumaran alongwith A.S.Shanthakumar @ Rajan, .... Easan @ Easwaran and ... Sigirthakumar, established a dairy farm in the year 1988 at Perumugai, Vellore for ostensible purpose of dealing in milk products. But wireless receiver sets were installed in these premises for contacting the leaders of the LTTE organization at Jaffna and getting instructions regarding concealment of arms and ammunitions in Tamil Nadu surreptitiously brought in by ship for commission of terrorist acts.”8
Some of the conclusions drawn by the Commission and the counsels were identical to the views of Lt Gen Depinder Singh and his successor. I quote, “Here, it is pertinent to point out that an indication of the widespread perception amongst the key officers of the Armed Forces of the country, who were at the helm of affairs when the IPKF was engaged in open hostilities with the LTTE, in Sri Lanka, is seen in the depositions of Lt. General Kalkat, Major General Yashwant Deva of the IPKF and Admiral Ramdas of the Indian Navy. All of them have conveyed their impressions that the DMK Government was sympathetic to the LTTE militants. The contention of the DMK party that the officials of the Defence Forces who attended the coordination meetings neither complained nor brought these allegations to the notice of the Tamil Nadu Government implies that militant activities were not going on in the State, is without any substance in view of the available evidence.”9
At the time of giving evidence before the Jain Commission I was not privy to what other witnesses had to say and the kind of games politicians, police and press play, the trio often targeting the upright soldiery. During the Raid, I did not get an opportunity to look through the trunk load of papers to see whether there were any cipher pads, code words or code names. I did not look into the circuit diagrams in the glossies that interested the militant electro-wizardry; perhaps we would have discovered a not-yet identified way of triggering the RCIEDs. The intelligence had descended that very day and greedily grabbed all that we had captured. Presumably the stuff was flown to Delhi. And what goes there seldom comes back.
Volumes
can be written about the exploits of the Signals, who took part in Op Pawan.
Electronic Control Centre was one of the joints where we gathered every evening
to get the briefing and plan ventures and forays, many along with infantry, a
few independent of them. A detachment of
4 Radio Monitoring Company was inducted in Madras in the last week of Sep 87
for this very purpose. A mention must be made of the good work done by L/Hav
Abdul Nabi who though not familiar with the art and technique of interception
and blessed with antique receiving equipment, did a commendable job in
identifying hostile transmissions and locations in Tamil Nadu from where these
had originated from.
Of significance are the adventures of Maj K S
Raghunathan. Having been seasoned in Jaffna, he was moved to HQ OFC and became
the principal intercept-analyst and EW errand boy. On 18 December he saw an
intercept that was quite revealing about the LTTE sympathizers and their
locations in Madras. He suggested to his commander then Col SRS Iyengar (later
rose to Lt Gen rank) that he be sent to physically verify the contents. Clad in
local dress, he kept a surreptitious watch of the place of rendezvous of the
militants. He earned fulsome praise for the information that he brought back.
An intelligence operation was launched based on his inputs, raising the stock
of tactical SIGINT to the coveted battle-winners.
On 18 November
1987 at 1840 hours, ULNK Ponnandy Pandian who was assigned to 340 (I) Infantry
Brigade intercepted a message giving the details of a gathering of the
militants. Sensing urgency, he went through the process expeditiously and
passed the contents to the brigade headquarters. The commander reacted post
haste. A raid was organized, executed with complete surprise and finesse. It
yielded handsome rewards and booty resulting in the capture of eight militants,
two Rifle SK – 47, one SMC 9 MM, one Pistol 9 MM, one Radio Sets I COM, seven
grenades all types, two tape recorders, seven magazines and 1328 rounds of
small arms ammunition.
Accompanying an infantry raiding party and providing
real time intelligence to the commander is the acme of combat communications.
The credit of planning first such operation goes to Lt Col BK Unnikrishanan and
its execution to Maj K Murthy. The former, on his own initiative, formed a mobile
intercept detachment to provide EW support to 1 MLI tasked to conduct an
independent mission with a view to flushing out the LTTE from the entire
Karaitivu Island (6606) west of the Jaffna peninsula. The battalion undertook
this operation during the period 7th November to 9th
November 1987. Maj K Murthy, a soldier to the marrow, volunteered to lead and
Nk Pandian Ranganathan who had earlier made a mark as a highly competent
interceptor, chose to join the mobile EW detachment. Together they formed a
versatile and a formidable team, feeding continuous information on LTTE
electronic ORBAT (order of battle) their cadres, camp locations, weapons and
movement by carrying out interception of LTTE radio transmission and
interpreting text to derive intelligence. During this operation the detachment
came under heavy LTTE fire on a number of occasions. Maj K Murthy, Naik Pandian
Ranganathan and other members of the team performed their task under heavy odds
and in the face of a torrent of small arms, automatic and mortar fire.
Electronic surveillance of LTTE dispositions, location of weapons and
discernment of plans resulted in successful mopping up operations and ousting
of LTTE from Karaitivu Island. Naik Pandian Ranganathan was awarded
Mention-in-Dispatches for bravery and Lt Col BK Unnikrishanan and Maj K Murthy
Chief of Army Staff’s Commendation Card for demonstrating a high degree of
professional competence and effective leadership.
After
receipt of better resources and induction of EW Group our performance became
more professional. The Racal DF equipment located twelve major hostile camps in 4 Infantry Divisional sector. Based
on these invaluable inputs, four ground operations were launched at different
points of time. Of these, three proved
lucrative. Successful operations were
conducted against Watta Mesai, Theesan and Miresh locations, while
action at Karai did not harvest positive.
In April 1989, an operation was launched based on information provided by a detachment of hand-held direction finding equipment. This led to capture of a senior militant leader using call sign “PN” along with his radio communication set up and cipher documents. Similar raids were conducted against radio station “Chicago.”
These are examples of what could be accomplished given the will, a dedicated team of electronic combatants, the sensor-shooter networking at the level of company and battalion, and an overall force commander of the like of Gen Depinder Singh, who appreciates and encourages. Our experiences are relevant to the much-touted network-centric warfare at tri-service macro level, which is the current fad of the Americans and rest of the world. In Afghanistan, which became the proving lab for the concept, the ideation suffered from absence of humint. Our merit lay in working in close association with those who detect, watch, observe and track the enemy in physical proximity. Paucity of resources was a serious handicap. Besides the analysis effort was manual, laborious and un-cybernated. Let me hasten to add that not all locations of terrorist activity gleaned through surveillance of the EM spectrum could be targeted or actively pursued. Further, the LTTE were using not only the citizen band in the VHF range, but also amateur radio and maritime frequencies in the HF band. We monitored some but left most to the intelligence agencies, which not only brand legitimate concern, but also hog resources.
With
terrorism as our enemy number one, history will not be made by a Churchil or a
Rommel, but by a commander of a raid, be it helicopter-borne, para-dropped,
assault-landed, foot-soldiered, electro-executed or cyber-mounted, which
eliminates a terrorist hideout, or hostile training, logistic or communication
facility, more within our country than without. Psychological pay off of a
successful raid is very high indeed. Many deeds of valour have found their
account in service journals, e.g. “Memories of Encounter with Militants,”
10 by Maj R R Singh, and “The Saga of a Young Infantry Battalion
Commander,”11 by Brig VDI Devavaram. Maj R R Singh describes a raid
that he conducted following an intercept that suggested meeting of LTTE
commanders, codenamed Kumar and Kennedy, who were responsible for killings in
his area of responsibility and “were planning to have a meeting on a crossroad
junction.”12 The merits of the raid, which lead to elimination of
two prominent LTTE cadres was in deception and seizure of opportunity in utter
disregard of consequences should it fail. The disguise that Maj R R Singh and
his radio operator had donned, even fooled the press, who thought the encounter
was between the LTTE and the TELO.13
Besides
motivation of the generations to come, the purpose of writing military history
is to cash on its repetitive nuances, create databases, disseminate information
and imbibe lessons, more to predict events and psycho-analyze the foe. I quote
the Epilogue and the Post Script from Col Neeraj Bali’s excellent account,
“Ambush” at Salmarg in J&K.14
“By way of lessons, I offer you two. Never disregard any
information, no matter how general it is. Listen aggressively – learn to
listen rather than talk to the locals --- And when you set your mind to
analyzing it, do not allow cliché to be the script-writer. Or you will arrive
at solutions that have ‘more of the same’ stamped all over them. You would end
up festooning militants with super human abilities that they simply do not
possess.”15
“Secondly
persist patiently and with the stomach of a stalker.”16 Col Bali emphasizes it with post-script poser, “Do
militants learn lessons?” He negates it
by describing another successful repeat of the ambush, the terrorists again
falling for the ruse.17
There are plenty of other lessons, the major being that opportunities cannot be sacrificed just because the tasks that they entail are not mission-specific, resources not adequate and errands politically not popular. Signals must team up with the infantry and make a formidable combine, if we have to win the war against terror. Let every ambush that we lay, every raid that we conduct and every offensive mission we undertake have a communication-electronics-codebreaker-cum-language expert accompany it, giving a running commentary of what is happening on “other side of the bush.” If a twelve-year old hacker can personify this all-in-one archetype, then why not we?
Notes